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Duopoly Investment Problems with Minimally Bounded
Adjustment Costs
David Mguni∗†
Abstract
In this paper, we study two-player investment problems with investment costs that
are bounded below by some fixed positive constant. We seek a description of optimal
investment strategies for a duopoly problem in which two firms invest in advertising
projects to abstract market share from the rival firm. We show that the problem
can be formulated as a stochastic differential game in which players modify a jump-
diffusion process using impulse controls. We prove that the value of the game may be
represented as a solution to a double obstacle quasi-variational inequality and derive a
PDE characterisation (HJBI equations) of the value of the game. We characterise both
the saddle point equilibrium and a Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum and non-zero-sum
payoff games.
Keywords: Impulse control, Stochastic Differential Games, Optimal Stopping,
Jump-diffusion, Dynkin Games, Verification Theorem, Duopoly, Advertising.
1 Introduction
Over the past three decades, a considerable amount of attention has been dedicated
towards modelling the duopolistic advertising problem. The problem is one of finding the
optimal dynamic investment strategy for a firm that seeks to maximise cumulative profits
over some given time horizon. Each firm uses strategic advertising investments to increase
market share. This paper is concerned with an investment problem in which two competing
firms make strategic investments over time in order to maximise their cumulative profits.
The paper studies a duopoly environment with future uncertainty. In order to accurately
model firm behaviour, we introduce the notion of fixed minimal investment costs so that the
competing firms incur at least some fixed minimum cost for each investment. This leads to a
new description of the advertising investment problem in terms of a non zero-sum stochastic
differential game involving impulse controls.
Early versions of the advertising oligopoly problem were formulated as single-player
optimal control models in which a controller maximises a payoff extracted from a system
whose evolution is governed by some deterministic process. Thus, in the early models of the
advertising problem, the influence of competing firms and the effect of future uncertainty
derived from market fluctuations and exogenous shocks were neglected (see for example
the surveys conducted in [rge82; Eri94]). To augment the model description, more recent
models include a larger repertoire of modelling features, firstly, by modelling the problem as
a (two-player) differential game framework the influence of a rival firm can be incorporated
into the system - this approach has yielded considerable descriptive success in modelling
the strategic interactions between firms. Following that, [PS04] (among others) adopts
a stochastic differential game approach to model the problem which accounts for future
uncertainty and random market fluctuations, the inclusion of which, has further increased
∗Quantitative and Applied Spatial Economic Research Laboratory, University College London, Gower
Street, London, WC1E 6BT, UK.
†Centre for Doctoral Training in Financial Computing & Analytics, University College London, Gower
Street, London, WC1E 6BT, UK. davidmguni@hotmail.com
1
Duopoly Investment Problems
modelling accuracy. We refer the reader to [Eri94] for exhaustive discussions on duopolistic
advertising models and to [PS04] for a stochastic differential game approach.
In each of the above models, the firms’ investment modifications are modelled using
continuous controls - in particular, it is assumed that the competing firms are able to make
infinitesimally fine adjustments to their investment positions that incur arbitrarily small
costs. In reality however, advertising investment projects have fixed minimal costs which
eliminates the possibility of continual investment since such a strategy would result in sin-
gular costs and hence, immediate firm ruin. The presence of fixed minimal costs produces
adjustment stickiness (rigidities) since firms now adjust their investment positions at discrete
points over irregular time intervals. Consequently, the set of feasible investment strategies
consists of those in which the firm makes a sequence of investments at selected times along
the firm’s lifetime. Despite the relevance of minimally bounded adjustment costs, the lit-
erature concerning multiplayer strategic environments with bounded costs remains scarce.
Indeed with the exception of the formal mathematical treatment of the zeros-sum case pre-
sented in [Cos12], models of multiplayer strategic interactions with bounded costs remain
limited to environments in which one of the players is allowed to modify the system dynamics
continuously (e.g. [Yon94; TY93; Zha11]).
To account for this, we construct an duopoly investment model in which each firm incurs
at least some fixed minimal cost for each advertising investment. To model this, we introduce
a non-zero-sum stochastic differential game in which both players use impulse controls to
modify the system dynamics. Moreover, in contrast to the models of advertising described
above, in order to embed into the description future uncertainty and exogenous economic
shocks, we construct a game in which the underlying diffusion process which is allowed to
have jumps.
The game we study is one in which two players modify a jump-diffusion process using
impulse controls in order to maximise some given payoff criterion; we give a PDE charac-
terisation of the value for the game for both zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. Though
the paper focuses on addressing the duopoly advertising investment problem, the frame-
work studied and subsequent results derived are general and therefore apply to modelling
competitive multiplayer environments with future uncertainty in which players face fixed
adjustment costs.
We show that the solutions (optimal investment strategies) to the problem can be repre-
sented as a solution to a double obstacle problem for a stochastic differential game in which
players use impulse controls to modify the system dynamics and give a PDE characterisation
of the optimal investment strategies.
Background Material
Problems that involve strategic modifications of a controlled dynamic system in com-
petitive environments have attracted much attention over recent years both in theoretical
and applied settings. In particular, there is a notable amount of literature on models of this
kind in which two players use continuous controls to modify the system dynamics to satisfy
some performance criterion. In the deterministic case, it was shown in [EK72b; EK72a]
and [ES84] that the deterministic differential game admits a value and in fact, the value
of the game is a unique solution to a HJBI equation in the viscosity sense. Following on
from this, in [FS89], the corresponding result was proven for the case in which the system
dynamics are stochastic. Indeed, building on the successes of the deterministic cases, the
study of stochastic differential game theory has produced significant results and has been
successfully applied in various settings within finance and economics.
Stochastic differential game theory underpins theoretical models used to prescribe opti-
mal portfolio strategies in a Black-Scholes market (see e.g. [Mk07; BC00]), descriptions of
pursuer-invader dynamics (see e.g. [PY81]) and investment games in competitive advertising
(see e.g. [rge82; Eri94; PS04]) amongst others.
If in the differential game, associated to the controllers’ modifications to the system dy-
namics is some fixed minimal cost, the appropriate mathematical framework is a differential
game in which the controllers use impulse controls to modify the system dynamics. In the
single player case, impulse control problems are stochastic control models in which the cost
of control is bounded below by some fixed positive constant which prohibits continuous con-
trol, thus the problem is augmented to one of finding both an optimal sequence of times to
apply the control policy, in addition to determining optimal control magnitudes.
Impulse control frameworks therefore underpin the description of financial environments
with transaction costs and liquidity risks and more generally, applications of optimal control
theory in which the system dynamics are modified by a sequence of discrete actions. We
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refer the reader to [BL82] as a general reference to impulse control theory and to [CG14;
PS10] for articles on applications.
Despite the fundamental relevance of fixed minimum costs within economics and finan-
cial systems, modelling multi-player competitive economic and financial systems has yet
to incorporate the use of impulse control theory. Indeed, unlike in the case of continuous
controls for which there is a plethora of studies, with the exception of the zero-sum game
studied in [Cos12], stochastic games in which the players use impulse controls remain largely
uninvestigated. Deterministic versions of this game were first studied by [Yon94; TY93] - in
the model presented in [Yon94], impulse controls are restricted to use by one player and the
other uses continuous control. Similarly, in [Zha11], stochastic differential games in which
one player uses impulse control and the other uses continuous controls were studied. Using
a verification argument, the conditions under which the value of the game (with a single
impulse controller) is a solution to a HJBI equation is also shown in [Zha11]. In [Cos12],
Cosso was the first to study a stochastic differential game in which both players use impulse
control using viscosity theory. Thus, in [Cos12] it is shown that the game admits a value
which is a unique viscosity solution to a double obstacle quasi-variational inequality. In ??
a nonzero-sum formulation of the game was studied from which a verification theorem that
characterises the value function of the game was derived. These results however do not cover
the general case of jump-diffusions.
Contribution
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the duopolistic advertising problem
using a differential game approach with impulsive controls. The paper also makes several
theoretical contributions to stochastic differential game theory involving impulse controls.
We extend the analyses in [Cos12] where stochastic differential games in which both con-
trollers use impulse controls were introduced, to consider i) system dynamics in which the
uncontrolled state process is allowed to have jumps ii) non-zero-sum payoff structures.
We prove verification theorems for both the zero-sum case and the non-zero-sum case in
which the appropriate equilibrium concept is a Nash equilibrium. A central component of
the proof of the verification theorem is the analysis the players’ non-intervention regions.
In the zero-sum case, the opponent’s actions produce two changes in the value function:
Firstly, each impulse action performed by the opponent produces an immediate shift in
the value of the state process, this in turn causes indirect changes to the value function
since the state process enters as one of its inputs. Secondly, at each intervention, the
opponent incurs an intervention cost which, in the zero-sum case represents a transfer of
wealth from the opponent to the player - this produces direct instantaneous changes to
the value function. To capture the two effects on the dynamics of the value function, it is
necessary to reformulate the impulse control system as a singular control system which has
minimally bounded adjustment costs (Lemma 5.3).
We then generalise the zero-sum payoff structure in the game to a non-zero-sum payoff
structure wherein we appeal to a Nash equilibrium as the appropriate equilibrium concept.
Owing to the fact that we use a verification theoretic approach, our proofs are markedly
different to [Cos12]. Both non-zero-sum payoff structures and the inclusion of jumps in the
underlying system dynamics serve as important modelling features for applications within
finance and economics.
Organisation
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, we introduce our dynamic duopoly model;
here we elucidate the key features of the problems and show that the underlying structures
are stochastic differential games. In section 3, we give a technical description of the stochastic
differential game in which impulse controls are used to modify the state process. In section
4, we prove some preliminary results that underpin the main analysis which is performed
in sections 6 and 7. In section 5, we give a precise statement of the optimal investment
strategies for the problem and give some relevant technical results. In section 6, we prove
a verification result for zero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls. In
section 7, we characterise the Nash equilibrium for the stochastic differential game in which
the payoff structure is no longer zero-sum. We then give some concluding remarks and lastly,
the appendix contains some of the technical proofs from sections 4-6.
We start by providing a description of a generalised duopolistic advertising problem.
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2 A Duopoly Investment Problem: Dynamic Competi-
tive Advertising
The Model
The problem is a firm advertising problem in which two firms compete for market share
in a duopoly market.
We develop our model by considering firstly two cases of advertising investment models
and then lastly present our model as a third case. To fix ideas, as our first case we consider an
environment in which both firms may only make continuous modifications to their investment
positions - this approach reproduces the stochastic differential game version of the Vidale-
Wolfe model of advertising.
In case II we consider environments in which advertising investments incur at least some
fixed minimal cost. We relax the zero-sum payoff structure and include a description of
cross-over effects from exogenous shocks within each firm’s market share process. In doing
so we construct a model of dynamic competitive advertising which encapsulates some of
the key features of the continuous control model. The current model however, has system
dynamics that evolve according a jump-diffusion process and, associated to each investment
is some fixed minimal cost.
We refer the reader to [Eri94; MDG10] for exhaustive discussions on duopoly advertising
investment models and to [PS04] for a stochastic differential game approach.
We now give a detailed analysis of each case. The results for the model in case II are
presented in section 8.
Overview
A overview of the three cases is as follows:
Consider two firms who compete for share of a single market. We will refer to the firms as
Firm 1 and Firm 2. Both firms seek to maximise profits over some (possibly fixed) horizon
by investing in advertising activities in order to increase market share and raise revenue
from sales.
2.1 Case I: Duopoly with Continuous Investments (Review)
As our first case, consider an duopoly in which each firm modifies the advertising investment
positions continuously. This approach provides a (generalised) description of a model which
reproduces the key features of the Vidale-wolfe model as considered in [Dea79].
At time t ∈ [t0, τS ] each Firm i has a revenue stream Si(t) which is a stochastic process,
τS ∈ R
+/{∞} is some (possibly random) time horizon of the firm’s problem. Denote by Ui
the set of admissible investments for Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2}; at any point, Firm i makes costly
investments of size ui ∈ Ui i.e. ui. Denote by M ∈ R
+ the potential market size and by
bi ∈]0, 1] the response rate to advertising, then the revenue stream for Firm i is given by the
following expression:
dSi(t) = biui(t
−)[M − St0,s0i (t)− S
t0,s0
j (t)]M
−1dt− riS
t0,s0
i (t)dt+ σ(t, S
t0,s0
i (t))dB(t). (1)
P−a.s., where s0 ∈ R are the initial sales, ri ∈ R are constants and i, j ∈ {1, 2}(i 6= j). The
term B(t) is Brownian motion which captures the random component of the system.
The cumulative profit for each Firm i is denoted by Πi, each firm seeks to maximise its
cumulative profit which consists of its revenue due to sales h : [t0, τS ] × R → R minus its
running advertising costs ci : [t0, τS ]×R→ R over the horizon τS <∞ and lastly, a function
of the firm’s terminal market share G : [t0, τS ]× R→ R. The profit function for each Firm
i, Πi is then described by the following:
Πi(t0, si;ui, uj) = E
[ ∫ τS
t0
(
h(S
t0,si,ui,uj
i (t))− [ci(t, ui)− cj(t, uj)]
)
dt+G(S
t0,si,ui,uj
i (τS))
]
,
(2)
Moreover, since the market is duopolistic, the payoff structure between the two firms is
zero-sum which gives the following condition:
Πi +Πj = 0 (3)
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We can now write the dynamic (zero-sum) duopoly problem as:
Find φ and (uˆ1, uˆ2) ∈ U1 × U2 s.th. for all (t, s0) ∈ [t0, τS ]× R:
φ(t, s0) = sup
u1∈U1
(
inf
u2∈U2
Πu1,u2(t, s0)
)
= inf
u1∈U1
(
sup
u2∈U2
Πu1,u2(t, s0)
)
= Πuˆ1,uˆ2(t, s0). (4)
where Π(u1,u2)(t, s0) ≡ Π(t, s0;u1, u2) = Π1(t, s0;u1, u2) = −Π2(t, s0;u1, u2).
We recognise (4) as the problem associated to a (zero-sum) stochastic differential game
and is a general version of the Vidale-Wolfe advertising model (see for example the differential
game extension of the Vidale-wolfe model in [Dea79]). Case I is a stochastic differential game
in which both players modify the state process using continuous controls, this approach was
used (for example [PS04]) to model the advertising duopoly investment problem. Thus,
we observe the behaviour of the firms in the advertising problem can be characterised by
computing the optimal policies a stochastic differential game.
We note finally that since the investment adjustments of each firm are described using
continuous controls, here firms are permitted to make arbitrarily small adjustments to their
investment positions which in turn, incur arbitrarily small costs.
Having conducted a review of the standard method of modelling the advertising problem,
we now adapt the Vidale-Wolfe framework to now accommodate fixed minimal investment
costs. Before constructing the main model of the section.
We now present the main model of the section:
2.2 Case II: Non-Zero-Sum Payoff with Impulse Controls with Jumps
In the above model, each firm can make investments of arbitrary size and with no minimal
cost. Additionally, the zero-sum payoff structure implies that a transfer of wealth occurs
between firms whenever an advertising investment is made. We wish to firstly remove this
feature and to secondly account for the effect that both firms have on the market which we
assume undergoes exogenous shocks.
Suppose now that each firm’s sales process experiences exogenous economic shocks and
that The firms now incur a fixed minimal cost for an advertising investment. Denote by
c : [t, τS ] × Z → R and χ : [t, τS ] × Z → R the cost function associated to the advertising
investments of Firm 1 and Firm 2 respectively where Z ⊆ R is a given set. In this case,
since the firms advertising investments incur minimal costs, we have that there exists positive
constants λ1 ∈ R
+ and λ2 ∈ R
+ s.th. c(t, ·) ≥ λ1 and χ(t, ·) ≥ λ2. Since now continuous
investment in the firm’s advertising projects would result in immediate bankruptcy, the firm
must now modify its advertising investments position in a discretised fashion. Each firm
therefore performs a sequence of advertising investments over the horizon of the problem.
Denote by U the set of admissible investments for Firm 1, then the sequence of in-
vestments {ξk}k∈N for Firm 1 is performed over a sequence of times {τk}k∈N. The in-
vestment strategy for Firm 1 is therefore given by a double sequence u = [τj , ξj ]j∈N ≡
(τ1, τ2, . . . ; ξ1, ξ2, . . .) ∈ U . Analogously, Firm 2 has an investment strategy which is denoted
by the following double sequence: v = [ρm, ηm]m∈N ≡ (ρ1, ρ2, . . . ; η1, η2, . . . ) ∈ V , so that
Firm 2 makes a sequence of investments {η}m∈Z which are made over a sequence of times
{ρm}m∈N where ηm ∈ Z and V is the set of admissible investments for Firm 2.
The rate of sales Si for each Firm i ∈ {1, 2} evolve according to the following expressions:
dS1(t) = µ1(S
t1,s1,u,v
1 (r))dr +
∑
j≥1
ξj · 1{τj≤τS}(t) + σ11(S
t1,s1,u,v
1 (r))dB1(r)
+ θ11(S
t1,s1,u,v
1 (t−), z)dΛ1 + σ12(S
t1,s1,u,v
1 (r))dB2(r) + θ12(S
t1,s1,u,v
1 (t−), z)dΛ2.
St1,s1,u,v1 (t1) = s1 ∈ R.
(5)
dS2(t) = µ2(S
t2,s2,u,v
2 (r))dr +
∑
m≥1
ηm · 1{ρm≤τS}(t) + σ22(S
t2,s2,u,v
2 (r))dB2(r)
+ θ22(S
t2,s2,u,v
2 (t−), z)dΛ2 + σ21(S
t2,s2,u,v
2 (r))dB1(r) + θ21(S
t2,s2,u,v
2 (t−), z)dΛ1.
St2,s2,u,v2 (t2) = s2 ∈ R.
(6)
where Λi =
∫ τS
t0
∫
R
zN˜(ds, dz) and where B1 and B2 are Wiener processes and N˜ is a
compensated Poisson random measure.
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Unlike in the competitive advertising models that appeal to differential games in which
the players’ modifications of their investment positions are modelled using continuous con-
trols (in which firms may make arbitrarily small advertising investments), the above model
now assumes that each advertising investment requires at least some fixed minimal cost.
Hence here, the firms undertake marketing and advertising projects at discrete points in
time in such a way that maximises their cumulative profit.
Our next modification is to relax the zero-sum payoff structure (3), we therefore decouple
the payoff criterion (2) into two profit functions Ji for each Firm i ∈ {1, 2}. Hence now Firm
i seeks to maximise its running profits over the fixed horizon τS <∞ plus a valuation of its
terminal market share hence we may write Firm i’s objective as:
Π1(t0, s1, s2;u, v) = E
[s1,s2]
[ ∫ τS
t0
e−ǫr[α1S
t1,s1,u,v
1 (r) − β1S
t1,s1,u,v
2 (r)]dr
−
∑
j≥1
c1(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤τS} + γ1e
−ǫτS [St1,s1,u,v1 (τS)]
2[St2,s2,u,v2 (τS)]
2
]
.
(7)
Π2(t0, s1, s2;u, v) = E
[s1,s2]
[ ∫ τS
t0
e−ǫr[α2S
t1,s1,u,v
2 (r) − β2S
t1,s1,u,v
1 (r)]dr
−
∑
m≥1
c2(ρm, ηm) · 1{ρm≤τS} + γ2e
−ǫτS [St1,s1,u,v1 (τS)]
2[St2,s2,u,v2 (τS)]
2
]
.
(8)
The above model has the following interpretation: the market share Si of Firm i deter-
mines the size of the revenue αiSi generated from sales, the parameters αi and βi may be
interpreted as representing the Firm i profit margin and the sensitivity of Firm i’s sales on
Firm j’s market share (respectively). In order to increase its revenue stream, each firm may
use advertising investments ({ξj}j∈N for Firm 1, {ηm}m∈N for Firm 2) to abstract market
share which reduces the rival firm’s revenue stream. However, increases in either firm’s mar-
ket size expands the economy leading to a higher terminal valuation for both firms which
is proportional to the square of the terminal cost, (this term is often included in models of
duopoly with finite horizon - see for example [kR97]).
The dynamic duopoly problem is now to characterise the policies (uˆ, vˆ) ∈ U × V and to
find the functions φi ∈ C([t, τS ],R) for i ∈ {1, 2} s.th.:
φ1 = sup
u∈U
Π1(t0, s1, s2;u, vˆ) = Π1(t0, s1, s2; uˆ, vˆ) (9)
φ2 = sup
v∈V
Π2(t0, s1, s2; uˆ, v) = Π2(t0, s1, s2; uˆ, vˆ), (10)
∀(t0, s1, s2) ∈ [t, τS ]× R× R.
The stochastic differential game therefore involves the use of impulse controls exercised
by both players who modify system dynamics to maximise some given payoff function.
In section 6 and 7, we provide a complete characterisation of the solution to the zero-
sum cases and non-zero-sum cases in terms of classical solution to a PDE (respectively). In
section 8 we apply the results of section 7 to characterise the firm’s policies for case II.
We now provide a formal description of the game. We begin by providing a description
and the relevant concepts for the zero-sum game which, in section 7 we shall adapt for the
non-zero-sum game:
3 Description of The Game
Stochastic differential games are environments in which a number of players interact by
altering the dynamics of a stochastic system by strategically selected magnitudes. The
players modify the system dynamics in order to maximise some state-dependant payoff
criterion over some time horizon where the space of payoffs is described by the sample space
and the players’ payoffs evolve according to some stochastic process.
Canonical Description
Let C(U ;G) be the set of continuous functions from some set U ⊆ R to a field G. The
index s ∈ [t, τS ] is time which runs continuously over some random and possibly finite time
horizon τS . We denote the coordinate mapping on C([t, τS ];R
p) by Bs(ωB) = ωB(s) and
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denote also by F = {Fs}s∈[t,τS] the completed natural filtration and define {Ft,s[t, τS ]} to be
{Fs}s∈[t,τS] restricted to the interval [t, s] (uncompleted natural filtration). Correspondingly,
we also denote by Wt,t′ a σ−algebra generated by the paths in C([t, τS ];R
p) up to time t′
and let B(s) ∈ Rp be a p−dimensional standard Brownian motion with state space S.
N˜(ds, dz) = N(ds, dz)− ν(dz)dt is a F−Poisson random measure with ν(·) := E[N(1, ·)] is
a Le´vy measure; both N˜(ds, dz) and B(s) are supported by the filtered probability space
and F is the filtration of the probability space(Ω,P,F = {Fs}s∈[t,τS]). We assume that N
and B are independent.
As in [CG14], we note that the above specification of the filtration ensures stochastic
integration and hence, the controlled jump diffusion is well defined (this is proven in [SV06]).
We suppose then that the uncontrolled passive state X ∈ S ⊂ Rp(p ∈ N), evolves
according to a (jump-)diffusion on (C([t, τS ];R
p), (F(t,s)s∈[t,τS ]
,F ,P0) that is to say for s ∈
[t, τS ] the state process obeys the following SDE:
dXt,x0s = µ(s,X
t,x0
s )ds+ σ(s,X
t,x0
s )dB(s) +
∫
γ(Xs−, z)N˜(ds, dz), X
t,x0
t := x0. (11)
∀ s ∈ [t, τS ], (t, x0) ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p;P−a.s.
We assume that the functions µ : [t, τS ] × R
p → Rp, σ : [t, τS ] × R
p → Rp×m and
γ : Rp × Rl → Rp×l satisfy the usual assumptions so as to ensure the existence of (11) (see
assumptions A.1.1 & A.2).
The generator of X (the uncontrolled process) is:
Lφ(x) =
p∑
i=1
µi(x)
∂φ
∂xi
+
1
2
p∑
i,j=1
(σσT )ij(x)
∂2φ
∂xi∂xj
+ Iφ(x) (12)
∀ x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p, where I is the integro-differential operator defined by:
Iφ(x) :=
l∑
j=1
∫
Rp
{φ(x+ γj(x, zj))− φ(x) −∇φ(x)γ
j(x, zj)}νj(dzj), (13)
∀x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p.
The state process is influenced by a pair of impulse controls u ∈ U , v ∈ V exercised by
each player where u(s) =
∑
j≥1 ξj ·1{τj≤τS}(s) for all s ∈ [t, τS ], with impulses {ξi} ∈ Z ⊂ S
are exercised by player I who intervenes at F -measurable stopping times {τi} where t ≤
τ1 < τ2 < · · · < and where v(s) =
∑
m≥1 ηm · 1{ρm≤τS}(s) for all s ∈ [t, τS ], with impulses
{ηm} ∈ Z ⊂ S are exercised by player II who intervenes at F−measurable stopping times
{ρm} where t ≤ ρ1 < ρ2 < . . . < where S ⊆ R
p is a given set. Thus, we interpret τn (resp.,
ρn) as the n
th time at which player I (resp., player II) modifies the system dynamics with
an impulse intervention ξn (resp., ηn).
We assume U ⊆ Rp and V ⊆ Rp are convex cones which are the set of admissible control
actions for player I and player II (resp.) and V is the set of admissible impulse values.
Indeed, let us suppose that an impulse ζ ∈ Z determined by some admissible policy w is
applied at some F−measurable stopping time τ ∈ [t, τS ] when the state is x
′ = Xt,x0,·(τ−),
then the state immediately jumps from x′ = Xt,x0,·(τ−) to Xt,x0,·,w(τ) = Γ(x′, ζ) where
Γ : Rp ×Z → Rp is called the impulse response function.
We assume that the impulses ξj (resp., ηm) are U− valued (resp., V− valued) and are
F−measurable for all j (resp., m).
The evolution of the state process with interventions is described by the equation:
X(r) = x+
∫ r
t
µ(s,Xt,x,u,v(s))ds +
∫ r
t
σ(s,Xt,x,u,v(s))dB(s) +
∑
j≥1
ξj · 1{τj≤τS}(r)
+
∑
m≥1
ηm · 1{ρm≤τS}(r) +
∫ r
t
∫
γ(Xt,x,ν(s−), z)N˜(ds, dz). (14)
for all s ∈ [t, τS ];P− a.s., where the player I impulse control u ∈ U player II impulse control
v ∈ V) is given by the following expression respectfully:
u(s) =
∑
j≥1
ξj · 1{τj≤τS}(s), v(s) =
∑
m≥1
ηm · 1{ρm≤τS}(s)) (15)
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Player I has a gain (or profit) function J which player I maximises given by the following
expression for all u ∈ U , v ∈ V , (t, x) ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p :
J(t, x;u, v) = E
[ ∫ τS
t
f(s,Xt,x,u,vs )ds+
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm) · 1{τm≤τS}
−
∑
l≥1
χ(ρl, ηl) · 1{ρl≤τS} +G(τS , X
t,x,u,v
τS
)
]
. (16)
where the functions f : [t, τS ]×R
p → R, G : [t, τS ]×R
p → R are deterministic, measurable,
uniformly continuous functions which we shall refer to as the running cost function and the
bequest function respectively.
In the zero-sum game, the payoff function J is also the player II cost function which
player II minimises.
Standing Assumptions
We assume that the state parameters µ : [t, τS ]× R
p → Rp, σ : [t, τS ]× R
p → Rp×m and
γ : Rp × Rl → Rp×l are deterministic, measurable functions that are Lipschitz continuous
and satisfy a growth condition. That is we assume the following conditions are satisfied:
A.1.1. Lipschitz Continuity
We assume there exist real-valued constants cµ, cσ > 0 and cγ(·) ∈ L
1 ∩ L2(Rl, ν) s.th.
∀s ∈ [t, τS ], ∀x, y ∈ R
p and ∀z ∈ Rl we have:
|µ(s, x)− µ(s, y)| ≤ cµ|x− y|
|σ(s, x) − σ(s, y)| ≤ cσ|x− y|∫
|z|≥1
|γ(x, z)− γ(y, z)| ≤ cγ(z)|x− y|.
A.1.2. Lipschitz Continuity
We also assume the Lipschitzianity of the running functions h, g, ψ and φ so that we
assume the existence of real-valued constants ch, cg, cψ, cφ > 0 s.th. ∀s ∈ [t, τS ], ∀(x, y) ∈ R
p
we have for R ∈ {h, g, k, l, ψ, φ}:
|R(s, x) +R(s, y)| ≤ cR|x− y|.
A.2. Growth Conditions
We assume the existence of a real-valued constants dµ, dσ > 0 and dγ(·) ∈ L
1∩L2(Rl, ν), ρ ∈
[0, 1) s.th. ∀(s, x) ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p and ∀z ∈ Rl we have:
|µ(s, x)| ≤ dµ(|1 + |x|
ρ|)
|σ(s, x)| ≤ dσ(|1 + |x|
ρ|)∫
|z|≥1
|γ(x, z)| ≤ dγ(|1 + |x|
ρ|).
A.3.
We also assume that there exists constants λc > 0 and λχ > 0 s.th. the following
conditions hold infξ∈Z c(s, ξ) ≥ λc, ∀ and infξ∈Z χ(·, ξ) ≥ λχ where ξ ∈ Z is a measurable
impulse intervention.
A.4.
We assume that the cost functions χ and c are quasi-linear in the impulse inputs. That is
to say for all Fτ−measurable stopping times τ ∈ [t, τS ] and for all Fτ−measurable impulse
interventions z ∈ Z we assume the functions χ and c take the following form:
χ(τ, z) ≡ a2(τ)z + κ2 and c(τ, z) ≡ a1(τ)z + κ1 (17)
for some constants κ1, κ2 > 0 and some functions ai : [t, τS ]→ R, i ∈ {1, 2}.
In the following exposition we will set a2(τ) ≡ λ2 ∈ R and a1(τ) ≡ λ1 for some λ1, λ2 ∈
R
+. We will also refer to λi and κi as the player i proportional intervention cost and fixed
intervention cost parts (resp.) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Assumptions A.1.1 and A.2 ensure the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (11) (c.f.
[IW81]). Assumption A.1.2 is required to ensure the regularity of the value function (see
for example [Cos12] and for the single-player case, see for example [MDG10]). Assumption
A.3 is integral to the definition of the impulse control problem. Lastly, assumption A.4 is
necessary to derive an equivalent singular control representation of the problem.
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Throughout the script we adopt the following standard notation (e.g. , [TY93; Zha11;
CG14]):
Notation
Let Ω be a bounded open set on Rp+1. Then we denote by: Ω¯ - The closure of the set Ω.
Q(s, x;R) = (s′, x′) ∈ Rp+1 : max |s′ − s|
1
2 , |x′ − x| < R, s′ < s.
∂Ω - the parabolic boundary Ω i.e. the set of points (s, x) ∈ S¯ s.th. R > 0, Q(s, x;R) 6⊂ Ω¯.
C{1,2}([t, τS ],Ω) = {h ∈ C
{1,2}(Ω) : ∂sh, ∂xi,xjh ∈ C(Ω)}, where ∂s and ∂xi,xj denote the
temporal differential operator and second spatial differential operator respectively.
∇φ = ( ∂φ
∂x1
, . . . , ∂φ
∂xp
) - The gradient operator acting on some function φ ∈ C1([t, τS ]× R
p).
Cd([a, b];U) - The set of ca`dla`g functions that map [a, b] 7→ U for some set U ⊆ Rp.
| · | - The Euclidean norm to which 〈x, y〉 is the associated scalar product acting between
two vectors belonging to some finite dimensional space.
As in [CG14], we will use the notation u = [τj , ξj ]j≥1 to denote the control policy
u =
∑
j≥1 ξj · 1{τj≤τS}(s) ∈ U which consists of F−measurable stopping times {τj}j∈N and
F -measurable impulse interventions {ξj}j∈N.
The following definitions will be useful:
Definition 3.1.
Denote by T(t,τ ′) the set of all F−measurable stopping times in the interval [t, τ
′], where
τ ′ is some stopping time s.th. τ ′ ≤ τS , if τ
′ = τS then we will denote by T ≡ T(t,τS). Let
u = [τj , ξj ]j∈N be a control policy where {τj}j∈N and {ξj}j∈N are Fτj− measurable stopping
times and interventions respectively. We denote by µt,τ (u) the number of impulses executed
within the interval [t, τ ] under the control policy u for some τ ∈ T .
Definition 3.2.
Let u a control policy. We say that an impulse control is admissible on [t, τS ] if the number
of impulse interventions is finite P−a.s, that is to say we have that: E[µt,τS(u)] <∞.
We shall hereon use the symbol U (resp., V) to denote the set of admissible controls for
player I (resp., player II).
For controls u ∈ U and u′ ∈ U , we interpret the notion u ≡ u′ on [t, τS ] iff P(u = u
′ a.e.
on [t, τS ]) = 1. For two player II controls v and v
′, we interpret the notion v ≡ v′ on [t, τS ]
analogously.
Definition 3.3.
Let u(s) =
∑
j≥1 ξj · 1{τj≤τS}(s);u ∈ U be a player I impulse control defined over [t, τS ],
further suppose that τ ∈ [t, τS ] and τ
′ ∈ [t, τS ] are two F−measurable stopping times with
τ ≥ s > τ ′, then we define the restriction u[τ ′,τ ] ∈ U of the impulse control u(s) to be
u(s) =
∑
j≥1 ξµt,τ+j · 1{τξµt,τ+j≥s≥τ′}
(s).
Analogously, we define the restriction for the player II control v(s) =
∑
m≥1 ηm·1{ρm≤τS}(s)
; v ∈ V defined over [t, τS ] so that we define the restriction v[ρ,ρ′] ∈ V of the impulse control
v(s) to be v(s) =
∑
m≥1 ηµt,ρ+m · 1{ρηµνt,ρ+m≥s≥ρ
′}(s) where ρ ∈ [t, τS ] and ρ
′ ∈ [t, τS ] are
two F−measurable stopping times s.th. ρ ≥ s > ρ′.
Strategies
A player strategy is a map from the other player’s set of controls to the player’s own set
of controls. An important feature of the players’ strategies is that they are non-anticipative
- neither player may guess in advance, the future behaviour of other players given his current
information. We formalise this condition by constructing non-anticipative strategies which
were used in the viscosity solution approach to differential games. Non-anticipative strategies
were introduced by , [EK72b; EK72a; Rox69; Var67]. Hence, in this game, one of the players
chooses his control and the other player responds by selecting a corresponding strategy.
Definition 3.4.
A non-anticipative strategy on [t, τS ] for Player I is a measurable mapping which we shall
denote by A s.th.: A : [t, τS ]×Ω×V(t,τS) → U(t,τS) and for any stopping time τ : Ω→ [t, τS ]
and any v1, v2 ∈ V(t,τS) with v1 ≡ v2 on [t, τ ] we have that A(v1) ≡ A(v2) on [t, τ ]. We define
Player II non-anticipative strategy B : [t, τS ] × Ω × U(t,τS) → V(t,τS) analogously. Hence, A
and B are Elliott-Kalton strategies.
Following the notation in [Cos12], we denote the set of all non-anticipative strategies for
Player I (Player II) by A(t,τS) (resp., B(t,τS)).
Remark 3.5.
The intuition behind definition 3.4 is as follows: suppose player I uses the strategy u1 ∈ U
and the system follows a path ω and that player II employs the strategy B ∈ Bt,τS against
the control u1. If in fact player II cannot distinguish between the control u1 and some other
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player I control u2 ∈ U then controls u1 and u2 induce the same response from the player II
strategy that is to say B(u1) ≡ B(u2).
Note that when either U or V is a singleton, the game collapses into a classical stochastic
impulse control problem with only one player with a value function and solution as that in
[kS07].
Definition 3.6.
Suppose we denote the space of measurable functions byH, suppose also that the function
φ : [t, τS ]× R
p → Rp s.th. φ ∈ H.
Let τ be some F−measurable stopping time and let A (resp., B ) be a non-anticipative
strategy on [t, τS ] for Player I (resp., player II). We define the [non-local] Player I-intervention
operator M1 : H → H acting at some F−measurable stopping time τ by the following
expression:
M1[φ] := inf
z∈Z
[φ(τ,Γ(X(τ−), z)) + c(τ, z) · 1{τ≤τS}]. (18)
We analogously define the [non-local] Player II-intervention operator M2 : H → H at
some F−measurable stopping time ρ by:
M2[φ] := sup
z∈Z
[φ(ρ,Γ(X(ρ−), z))− χ(ρ, z) · 1{ρ≤τS}]. (19)
where Γ : Rp ×Z → Rp is the impulse response function defined earlier.
Given the remarks of section 3, we now define the value functions of the game. As in
[FS89; Cos12], we define the value functions in terms of Elliot-Kalton strategies introduced
in [EK72b]:
Definition 3.7
For any x ∈ [t, τS ] × R
p and (t, x0) ∈ [t, τS ] × R
p the two value functions associated to
the game are given by the following expressions:
V −(x) = inf
u∈U
sup
v∈V
J(t, x;u, v);
V +(x) = sup
v∈V
inf
u∈U
J(t, x;u, v)
where we will refer to V − and V + as the upper and lower value functions respectively.
We say that the value of the game exists if ∀x ∈ [t, τS ] × R
p we can commute the
supremum and infimum operators in definition 3.7 wherein we can deduce the existence of
a function V ∈ C1,2([t, τS ];R
p) with V ≡ V −(x) = V +(x).
Remark 3.8.
Suppose the value of the game exists. We may then note, with particular reference to
the duopoly problem in section 2, according to the law of supply and demand, the quantity
∂xV (x) represents the revenue associated with a marginal change in the components thus,
∂xV (x) is the market price when the quantity available is x.
Remark 3.9.
Suppose the value of the game exists. Then the term MiV (·, x), i ∈ {1, 2} that is,
the non-local intervention operator Mi acting the value function associated to the game
represents the value of the player i strategy that consists of performing the best possible
intervention at some given time s ∈ [t, τS ] when the state is at x ∈ R
p, then performing
optimally thereafter.
We note however, that an immediate intervention may not be optimal, hence ∀(s, x) ∈
[t, , τS ]× R
p the following inequalities hold:
M1V (s, x) ≥ V (s, x) (20)
M2V (s, x) ≤ V (s, x) (21)
Statements (20) and (21) in fact follow as a direct consequence of the dynamic program-
ming principle. A formal statement and proof for the single impulse controller case is given
as Lemma 3.5 in [Zha11] for which both proof and results are entirely applicable in our case.
4 Main Results
We prove two key theoretical results for the game that characterise the conditions for a
HJBI equation in both zero-sum and non-zero-sum games.
10
Duopoly Investment Problems
We prove a verification theorem (Theorem 6.1) for stochastic differential games with a
jump-diffusion process and in which the players use impulse controls. In doing so, we prove
the following statement
Theorem 4.1.
Suppose that the value of the zero-sum game V exists and that V ∈ C1,2([t, τS ],R
p) then
the value of the game satisfies the following double obstacle quasi-variational inequality
∀y ∈ Rp, x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p:{
max{min[−(∂sV (x) + LV (x) + f(x)), V (x)−M2V (x)], V (x)−M1V (x)} = 0
V (τS , y) = G(τS , y)
(22)
Moreover, denote by uˆ := [τˆj , ξˆj ]j∈N and vˆ := [ρˆm, ηˆm]m∈N the equilibrium controls, then V
satisfies the following expressions:
∆
ξˆj
V (X(τˆj)) = −c(τˆj , ξˆj). (23)
where ∆zφ(X(τ)) := φ(Γ(X(τ−), z))− φ(X(τ−)) +∆NX(τ) and for some Fτ−measurable
stopping intervention z ∈ Z and ∆NX(τ) denotes a jump at some Fτ−measurable time
τ ∈ [t, τS ] due to N˜ .
For the non-zero-sum payoff case, we have the following result:
Theorem 4.2.
Denote by φi the Firm i value function for the non-zero-sum game for i ∈ {1, 2}, then
the value functions φi satisfy the following quasi-variational inequalities ∀y ∈ R × R, x ∈
[t, τS ]× R× R:{
max{−(∂sφi(x) + Lφi(x) + fi(x)), φi(x)−Miφi(x)} = 0,
φi(τS , y) = φi(τS , y).
(24)
The following results characterise the optimal investment policies for the duopoly prob-
lem described in section 2:
Theorem 4.3.
Suppose that the market share Xi of Firm i, (i ∈ {1, 2}) evolves according to (5)- (6)
and let the firm payoff functions be given by (7) - (8), then the sequence of optimal invest-
ments uˆ = [τˆj , ξˆj ]j∈N ≡
∑
j≥1 ξˆj · 1{τˆj≤τS}(s) for Firm 1 is characterised by the investment
times {τˆj}j∈N and investment magnitudes {ξˆj}j∈N where [τˆj , ξˆj ]j∈N are constructed via the
following expressions:
i. τˆ0 ≡ t0 and τˆj+1 = inf{s > τj ;X
uˆ,v
1 (s) < x
∗
1} ∧ τS ∀v ∈ V
ii. ξˆj = xˆ1 −X1(τˆj).
Similarly for Firm 2, the optimal sequence of investments vˆ := [ρˆm, ηˆm]m∈N =
∑
m≥1 ηˆm ·
1{ρˆm≤τS}(s) is given by:
i. ρˆ0 ≡ t0 and ρˆm+1 = inf{s > ρm;X
u,vˆ
2 (s) < x
∗
2} ∧ τS ∀u ∈ U ,
ii. ηˆm = xˆ2 −X2(ρˆm),
where the quadruplet (x∗1, x
∗
2, xˆ1, xˆ2) is determined by the following equations (i ∈ {1, 2}):
C1r1,ie
r1,ix
∗
i + C2r2,ie
r2,ix
∗
i +
αi
ǫ
= λi (25)
C1r1,ie
r1,ixˆi + C2r2,ie
r2,ixˆi +
αi
ǫ
= λi (26)
C1(e
r1,ix
∗
i − er1,ixˆi) + C2(e
r2,ix
∗
i − er2,ixˆi) = −κi +
(
λi −
αi
ǫ
)
(x∗i − xˆi), (27)
where C1 and C2 are endogenous constants whose values are determined by (25) - (27),
λi and κi are the Firm i proportional and fixed intervention costs (respectively), αi is the
Firm i margin parameter, ǫ is the discount rate and the values r1,i and r2,i are roots of the
equation:
q(rk,i) :=
1
2
σ2iir
2
k,i + µirk,i − ǫ+
∫
R
{erk,iθijz − 1− θijrk,iz}νj(dz), (28)
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for i, j, k ∈ {1, 2}.
Theorem 4.3 says that each firm performs a sequence of investments over the time horizon
of the problem. The decision to invest is determined by the firm’s market share process -
in particular, at the point at which Firm i’s share of the market falls below the level x∗i ,
then the firm performs an investment in order to raise its market share to xˆi, where the
fixed values xˆi and x
∗
i are determined by the given parameters λi, λj , κi, κj , αi, ǫ via (25) -
(27). In particular, each Firm i seeks to retain a market share of at least x∗i , where x
∗
i is a
quantity determined by the size and influence of both firms. At any point Firm i’s market
share falls below x∗i the firm immediately reacts by performing an investment in order to
raise its market share to xˆi and in doing so abstracting market share from its competitors.
Thus if S is the total size of the market the value S − x∗i represents the maximum level of
market share that Firm i is prepared to cede to other firms.
In summary, each firm observes its own market share and only intervenes at the points
at which the firm’s market share has fallen below some fixed level. At this point, the firm
performs an advertising investment in order to raise the market share to within some prefixed
levels. For each firm, both the minimum market share and the investment magnitudes are
determined by the firm’s size and the responsiveness of the market to advertising investments
of both firms. Each firm’s intervention policy is reactant to the investment and subsequent
market acquisition of the other firm, each firm therefore reacts by performing the best
sequence of response investments to the other firm’s investment strategy.
The following corollary follows directly from Theorem 4.3 and establishes when each of
the firm performs investments under the optimal Nash equilibrium strategy:
Corollary 4.4.
For the duopoly advertising problem, the sample space splits into three regions: a region
in which Firm i performs an advertising investment - I1, a region in which Firm 2 performs
an advertising investment- I2 and a region in which no action is taken by either firm I3.
Moreover, the three regions are characterised by the following expressions for :
Ij = {x < x
∗
j |x, x
∗
j ∈ R}, i, j ∈ {1, 2}
I3 = {x ≥ x
∗
i ∧ x
∗
j |x, x
∗
i , x
∗
j ∈ R}.
where the x∗i , x
∗
j , i, j ∈ {1, 2} are determined by (25) - (27).
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to deal with a jump-diffusion process within a
stochastic differential game in which the players use impulse controls to modify the state
process.
5 Preliminaries
Lemma 5.1.
Let (τ, x) ∈ [t, τS ]×R
p where τ is some F - measurable stopping time, then the set Ξ(τ, x)
defined by:
Ξ(τ, x) := {ξ ∈ Z :MV (τ−, x) = V (τ, x+ ξ) + c(τ, ξ) · 1{τ≤τS}} (29)
is non-empty.
The proof of the lemma is essentially that given as the proof of Lemma 3.7 in [CG14]
with little adaptation - we therefore omit the proof of lemma here.
Definition 5.2. [GT08]
Let I ⊂ R be an open and possibly unbounded interval and denote its closure by I¯.
Suppose x ∈ I¯, then an admissible singular control is a pair (ν+s , ν
−
s )s≥t of F−adapted,
non-decreasing ca´dla´g processes s.th. ν+(t) = ν−(t) = t,X(t) := x+ ν+s − ν
−
s and dν
+, dν−
are supported on disjoint subsets.
The following result demonstrates that general impulse control problems can be rep-
resented as a singular control problem, in particular it shows that the game (16) can be
represented as a game of singular control.
Lemma 5.3.
Let (ν1(s), ν2(s)) ∈ R
p × Rp be a pair of adapted finite variation ca`dla`g processes with
increasing components. Then the impulse control problem can be written as the following
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equivalent singular control problem ∀(t, x) ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p,P−a.s.:
inf
ν1
sup
ν2
J(t, x; ν) = E
[ ∫ τS
t
f(s,Xt,x,νs )ds+
∫ τS
t
Θ1(s)dν1(s)
−
∫ τS
t
Θ2(s)dν2(s) +G(τS , X
t,x,ν
τS
)
]
(30)
and given some admissible player I (resp., player II) control policy u = [τj , ξj ]j∈N (resp.,
v = [ρm, ηm]m∈N) where the cost functions c and χ for player I and player II respectively
are given by the following expressions ∀ξ, η ∈ Z:
c(τk, ξk) ≡ λ1ξk + κ1 and χ(ρm, ηm) ≡ λ2ηm + κ2, (31)
where λi ∈ R
+ and κi ∈ R
+ are the player i proportional intervention cost and fixed
intervention cost parts (resp.) for i ∈ {1, 2}. The state process X evolves follows the SDE:
X(r) = x+
∫ r
t
µ(s,Xt,x,ν(s))ds+
∫ r
t
σ(s,Xt,x,ν(s))dB(s) + ν(r) (32)
+
∫ r
t
∫
γ(Xt,x,ν(s−), z)N˜(ds, dz) (33)
P− a.s. ∀(t, x) ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p.
We will use Lemma 5.3 in order to prove a verification theorem for the stochastic differ-
ential game which has a zero-sum payoff structure.
We defer the proof of Lemma 5.3 to the appendix.
6 A HJBI Equation for Zero-Sum Stochastic Differen-
tial Games with Impulse Controls.
In this section, we give a verification theorem for the value of the game therefore giving
conditions under which the value of the game is a solution to the HJBI equation.
To accommodate the influence of impulses exercised by player II on the value function,
it is necessary to reformulate the problem as a singular impulse control problem for which
we appeal to Lemma 5.3. The following theorem characterises the conditions in which the
value of the game satisfies a HJBI equation:
Theorem 6.1 [Verification Theorem for Zero-Sum Games with Impulse Control]
Let τ be some F−measurable stopping time and denote by Xˆ(τ) = X(τ−) + ∆NX(τ)
where ∆NX(τ) denotes a jump at some Fτ−measurable time τ due to N˜ . Denote also by
∆zφ(X(τ)) := φ(Γ(X(τ−), z)) − φ(X(τ−)) + ∆NX(τ) where τ ∈ [t, τS ] and z ∈ Z is some
Fτ−measurable stopping time and intervention (resp.).
Suppose that the value of the game exists and that V ∈ C1,2([t, τS ], S) ∩ C([t, τS ], S¯). In
the following we will use the shorthand and denote by X(s) ≡ (s,X) ∀(s,X) ∈ [t, τS ] × R
p
and φ ≡ φ(X, ·) ≡ φ(X) ∀X ∈ S.
Suppose also that there exists a function φ that satisfies technical conditions (T1) - (T4)
and the following conditions:
i. φ ∈ C1([t0, τS ], S) ∩ C([t0, τS ], S¯)
ii. φ ≤M1φ in S and φ ≥M2φ in S
where D1 and D2 are defined by: D1 = {X ∈ S, s ∈ [t, τS ];φ(X) < M1φ(X)} and
D2 = {X ∈ S, s ∈ [t, τS ];φ(X) > M2φ(X)} where we refer to D1 (resp., D2) as the
player I (resp., player II) continuation region.
iii. ∂φ
∂s
+ Lφ(X ·,uˆ,v(·)) + f(X ·,uˆ,v(·)) ≤ 0 ∀v ∈ V , X ∈ S\∂D2.
iv. ∂φ
∂s
+ Lφ(X ·,u,vˆ(·)) + f(X ·,u,vˆ(·)) ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ U , X ∈ S\∂D1.
v. ∂φ
∂s
+ Lφ(X ·,uˆ,vˆ(·)) + f(X ·,uˆ,vˆ(·)) = 0 in D ≡ D1 ∩D2 ∀X ∈ S.
vi. X ·,u,v(τS) ∈ ∂S P−a.s. on {τS < ∞} and φ(X
·,u,v(·)) → G(X ·,u,v(τS)) · 1{τS<∞} as
s→ τ−S P−a.s.,∀X ∈ S, u ∈ U , v ∈ V
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vii. ξˆk ∈ arginfz∈Z{φ(Γ(X(τk−), z)) + c(τk, z)} is a Borel Measurable selection and sim-
ilarly, ηˆj ∈ argsupz∈Z{φ(Γ(X(τj−), z)) − χ(ρj , z)} is a Borel Measurable selection
∀X ∈ S.
Put τˆ0 ≡ t and define uˆ := [τˆj , ξˆj ]j∈N inductively by:
τˆj+1 = inf{s > τj ;X
[·,uˆ],v(·) /∈ D1} ∧ τS ∀x ∈ S, v ∈ V similarly, put ρˆ0 ≡ t and define
vˆ := [ρˆm, ηˆm]m∈N inductively by ρˆm+1 = inf{s > ρm;X
·,u,vˆ(·) /∈ D2} ∧ τS ∀x ∈ S, u ∈ U .
xiii. ∆zφ(X(ρˆm)) = χ(ρˆm, z) and ∆ξˆjφ(X(τˆj)) = −c(τˆj , z)
∀ z ∈ Z and the intervention times {ρˆm}m∈N ,{τˆj}j∈N
Then
φ(x) = J(t, x; uˆ, vˆ) = inf
u∈U
sup
v∈V
J(t, x;u, v) = sup
v∈V
inf
u∈U
J(t, x;u, v) (34)
for all x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p
Theorem 6.1 says that if a sufficiently smooth function can be found then the value
function of the game is characterised in terms of a PDE.
From Theorem 6.1 we also see that the sample space aligneds into three regions that
consist of a continuation region, in which neither player performs an intervention and in-
tervention regions for each player within which the players perform an impulse execution.
That is we have the following corollary:
Corollary 6.2.
The sample space aligneds into three regions that represent a region for player I inter-
ventions I1 a region for player II interventions I2, and a region I3 in which no action is taken
by neither player; moreover the three regions are characterised by the following expressions:
I1 = {x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p : V (x) =M1V (x),LV (x) + f(x) ≥ 0}.
I2 = {x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p : V (x) =M2V (x),LV (x) + f(x) ≥ 0}.
I3 ={x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p : V (x) <M1(x), V (x) >M2V (x);LV (x) + f(x) = 0}.
Proof of Theorem 6.1.
In the following, we make the distinction between the jumps due to the players’ impulse
controls and the jumps due to N˜ . Indeed, let τ ∈ [t, τS ] be some F−measurable stop-
ping time we denote by Xˆ(τ) = X(τ−) + ∆NX(τ) where ∆NX(τ) is the jump at some
Fτ−measurable time τ due to N˜ where
∆NX(s) =
∫
γ(Xs−, z)N˜(ds, dz) and N˜(ds, dz) = N˜(s, dz)− N˜(s−, dz).
Similarly, given an impulse ξ ∈ Z (resp., η ∈ Z) exercised by player I (resp., player II),
we denote the jump induced by the player I (resp., player II) impulse by ∆ξ (resp., ∆η).
That is, if we suppose that τ ∈ [t, τS ] is some Fτ−measurable intervention time for player
I, then we define
∆ξφ(X
t,x0,u,v(τ)) := φ(Γ(Xt,x0,u,v(τ−), ξ))−φ(Xt,x0,u,v(τ−))+∆Nφ(X
t,x0,u,v(τ)) to be the
change in φ due to the player I impulse ξ ∈ Z where Γ : Rp×Z → Rp is the impulse response
function. We define ∆η analogously so that ∆ηφ(X
t,x0,u,v(ρ)) := φ(Γ(Xt,x0,u,v(ρ−), η)) −
φ(Xt,x0,u,v(ρ−)) +∆Nφ(X
t,x0,u,v(ρ)) is the change in φ due to the player II impulse η ∈ Z
at some Fρ−measurable intervention time ρ ∈ [t, τS ].
To prove the theorem, we will use a singular control representation of the combined
impulse controls for each player. For our first case, we define ν by ν(s) = η(s) + ξ(s) where
ν is a process consisting of the combined player I and player II controls. Note that by
Lemma 5.3 we have the following equivalences ∀r ∈ [t, τS ]:
a. ξ(r) =
∑µ[t,r]
m=1 ξj · 1{τj≤τS}
b. η(r) =
∑µ[t,r]
m=1 ηm · 1{ρm≤τS}
c.
∫ r′
r
dξ(s) =
∑µ[r,r′](v)
j=1 c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤τS}
d.
∫ r′
r
dη(s) =
∑µ[r,r′](v)
m=1 χ(ρm, ηm) · 1{ρm≤τS}
We now fix vˆ = [ρˆm, ηˆm]m≥1 ∈ V and hence using (a) and (b) we find that ν(s) is now
given by ν(s) =
∑
m≥1 ηˆ(s) · 1{ρm≤τS} +
∑
j≥1 ξ(s) · 1{τj≤τS}.
14
Duopoly Investment Problems
By Itoˆ’s formula for ca`dla`g semi-martingale (jump-diffusion) processes (see for example
theorem II.33 of [Pro03] in conjunction with Theorem 1.24 of [kS07]), we have that:
E[φ(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(τj))]− E[φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τj+1−))]
= −E
[ ∫ τj+1
τj
∂φ
∂s
+ Lφ(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(s))ds +
∑
νt,τj (vˆ)<m<νt,τj+1 (vˆ)
∆νφ(X
t,x0,u,vˆ(ρˆm))
]
. (35)
We note firstly that by definition of the intervention times {τj}j∈N we have that µ[τj ,τj+1)(u) =
0 since no player I interventions occur in the interval [τj , τj+1). Hence, on the interval
[τj , τj+1) we have that ∆ν = ∆ηˆ in particular, ∆νφ = ∆ηˆφ so that ∆νφ(X
t,x0,u,vˆ(ρˆm)) =
∆ηˆφ(X
t,x0,u,vˆ(ρˆm)).
Hence, by (xiii) we have that:
E[φ(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(τj))]− E[φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τj+1−))]
= −E
[ ∫ τj+1
τj
∂φ
∂s
+ Lφ(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(s))ds +
∑
νt,τj (vˆ)<m<νt,τj+1 (vˆ)
χ(ρˆm, ηˆm)
]
. (36)
Summing both sides from j = 0 to j = k <∞ , we obtain the following:
φ(x) +
k∑
j=1
E[φ(Xˆt,x0,u,vˆ(τj))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j ))] − E[φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−k+1))]
≤ E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
f(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(s))ds −
∑
m<νt,τk+1 (vˆ)
χ(ρˆm, ηˆm)
]
. (37)
Now by definition of the non-local intervention operator M1, we have that
φ(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(τj)) = φ(Γ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τj−), ξj)) ≥M1φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τj−))− c(τj , ξj),
hence,
φ(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(τj))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τj−)) ≥M1φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τj−))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τj−))− c(τj , ξj),
(38)
and by (vii) we readily observe that:
φ(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(τS)) − φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τS)) = 0. (39)
After plugging (38) into (37) we obtain the following:
φ(x) +
k∑
j=1
E[M1φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j ))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j ))− c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≥τS}]
−E[φ(Xˆt,x0,u,vˆ(τ−k+1))]
≤ E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
f(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(s))ds −
∑
m<νt,τk+1 (vˆ)
χ(ρˆm, ηˆm)
]
.
Hence,
φ(x) +
k∑
j=1
E[M1φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j ))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j ))] · 1{τj≤τS} (40)
≤ E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
f(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(s))ds+ φ(Xˆt,x0,u,vˆ(τ−k+1)) +
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤τk} −
∑
m<νt,τk+1
χ(ρˆm, ηˆm)
]
,
(41)
using the fact that
∑k
j=1 c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤τS} ≡
∑
j≥1 c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤τk}. Now
limk→∞
∑k
j=1 E[M1φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τj−)) − φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j ))] = 0 since by (vi) we have that
φ(Xˆt,x0,·(τj))−φ(Xˆ
t,x0,·(τ−j )) = 0,P− a.s. when τj = τS we can then deduce the statement
by Lemma 3.10 in [CG14] i.e. using the 12 -Ho¨lder continuity of the non-local operator M1.
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Similarly we have by (xii) that φ(X ·,(s)) → G(X ·,(τS)) · 1{τS<∞} as s → τ
−
S P−a.s. Hence,
letting k →∞ in (41) gives:
φ(x) ≤ E
[ ∫ τS
t
f(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(s))ds +
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤τS} −
∑
n≥1
χ(ρˆn, ηˆn) · 1{ρˆn≤τS}
+G(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(τS))
]
.
Since this holds for all u ∈ U , we have that:
φ(x) ≤ inf
u∈U
E
[ ∫ τS
t
f(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(s))ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj)) · 1{τj≤τS} −
∑
n≥1
χ(ρˆn, ηˆn) · 1{ρˆn≤τS}
+G(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(τS))
]
.
In particular, we have that:
φ(x) ≤ sup
v∈V
inf
u∈U
E
[ ∫ τS
t
f(Xt,x0,u,v(s))ds +
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤τS} −
∑
n≥1
χ(ρn, ηn) · 1{ρn≤τS}
+G(Xt,x0,u,v(τS))
]
= V +(x).
(42)
Using an analogous arguments, namely replacing vˆ with uˆ in (35), then performing
similar steps (using condition (vi)) we can similarly prove that:
φ(x) ≥ inf
u∈U
sup
v∈V
E
[ ∫ τS
t
f(Xt,x0,u,v(s))ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤τS} −
∑
m≥1
χ(ρm, ηm) · 1{ρm≤τS}
+G(Xt,x0,u,v(τS))
]
= V −(x).
Let us now fix the pair of controls (uˆ, vˆ) ∈ U ×V , using the definition of ∆z and by (xiii)
we have that:
0 = ∆zφ(X(ρˆm)− χ(ρˆm, z)
= φ(Γ(X(ρˆ−m, z)))− φ(X(ρˆ
−
m)) + ∆NX(ρˆm)− χ(ρˆm, z) (43)
= φ(Γ(Xˆ(ρˆ−m, z)))− φ(X(ρˆ
−
m))− χ(ρˆm, z). (44)
Now since (44) holds for all z ∈ Z, after applying sup to both sides of (44) we find that:
0 = sup
z∈Z
[φ(Γ(Xˆ(ρˆ−m), z))− χ(ρˆm, z)]− φ(Xˆ(ρˆ
−
m)) =M2φ(Xˆ(ρˆ
−
m))− φ(Xˆ(ρˆ
−
m)),
from which we immediately deduce the statement:
M2φ(Xˆ(ρˆ
−
m)) = φ(Xˆ(ρˆ
−
m)). (45)
From which we see that an immediate impulse intervention at ρˆm is indeed optimal for
player II.
Using analogous arguments we can deduce that:
M1φ(Xˆ(τˆ
−
j )) = φ(X(τˆ
−
j )). (46)
We hereafter straightforwardly observe using (v) and (T4) we find the following equality:
φ(x) = E
[ ∫ τS
t
f(Xt,x0,uˆ,vˆ(s))ds +
∑
j≥1
c(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τˆj≤τS} −
∑
m≥1
χ(ρˆm, ηˆm) · 1{ρˆm≤τS}
+G(Xt,x0,uˆ,vˆ(τS))
]
.
Hence, we can deduce the following statement:
V +(x) ≥ φ(x) ≥ V −(x). (47)
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Now, by definition of V + and V − we always have that V −(s, x) ≥ V +(s, x)
∀(s, x) ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p, hence we deduce that:
V +(x) = V −(x) = V (x). (48)
and
V (x) = φ(x). (49)
∀x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p.
after which we deduce the thesis.
7 A HJBI Equation for Non-Zero-Sum Stochastic Dif-
ferential Games with Impulse Controls
In this section, we study the games as described in section 3, however we now extend
the results to non-zero-sum stochastic differential games. The results of this section are
loosely based on [Mk07] where we make the necessary adjustments to accommodate impulse
controls. We prove a non-zero-sum verification theorem for the game in which both players
use impulse controls to modify the state process.
Suppose firstly that the uncontrolled passive state X ∈ S ⊂ Rp(p ∈ N), evolves according
to a (jump-)diffusion (i.e. 11).
Suppose also that player I (resp., player II) uses the impulse controls u ∈ U (resp., v ∈ V
) drawn from a set of admissible controls U (resp., V ) to modify the state process also as
described in section 3. As in [Mk07], we decouple the objective performance functions so
that we now consider the following payoff functions:
J
(u˜,v˜)
1 (x) = E
[ ∫ τS
t
f1(X
t,x0,u˜,v˜(s))ds−
∑
j≥1
c1(τ˜j , ξ˜j) · 1{τj≤τS} +G1(X
t,x0,u˜,v˜(τS))
]
(50)
J
(uˆ,v˜)
2 (x) = E
[ ∫ τS
t
f2(X
t,x0,u˜,v˜(s))ds−
∑
m≥1
c2(ρ˜m, η˜m) · 1{ρm≤τS} +G2(X
t,x0,u˜,v˜(τS))
]
(51)
where (t, x) ∈ [t, τS ] × R
p, uˆ = [τˆj , ξˆj ]j≥1, u˜ = [τ˜j , ξ˜j ]j≥1 are admissible controls for player I
and vˆ = [ρˆm, ηˆm]m≥1, v˜ = [ρ˜m, η˜m]m≥1 are admissible controls for player II.
We note that the function J
(u˜,vˆ)
1 (x) (resp., J
(uˆ,v˜)
2 (x)) defines the payoff received by the
player I (resp., player II) uses the control u˜ ∈ U (resp., v˜ ∈ V) and player II (resp., player I)
uses the control vˆ ∈ V (resp. uˆ ∈ U).
Since we are now handling a game with a non-zero-sum payoff structure, we must adapt
the definitions of the non-local intervention operators (definition 3.6) to the following:
Definition 7.1.
Let φ : [t, τS × R]
p → R s.th. φ ∈ C([t, τS ];R
p). Let τ be some F−measurable stopping
time and A (resp., B ) let be a non-anticipative strategy on [t, τS ] for Player i. We define
the [non-local] Player I-intervention operator Mi : H → H acting at some F−measurable
stopping time τ ∈ [t, τS ] by the following expression:
Mi[φ] := sup
z∈Z
[φ(Γ(X(τ−), z))− ci(τ, z) · 1{τ≤τS}] (52)
where Γ : Rp × R→ Rp is the impulse response function.
Definition 7.2. [Nash Equilibrium]
We say that a pair (uˆ, vˆ) ∈ U×V is a Nash equilibrium of the stochastic differential game
with impulse controls uˆ = [τˆj , ξˆj ]j∈N ∈ U , vˆ = [ρˆm, ηˆm]m∈N ∈ V if the following statements
hold:
J
(u,vˆ)
1 (x) ≥ J
(uˆ,vˆ)
1 (x) for all u ∈ U and ∀x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p
J
(uˆ,v)
2 (x) ≥ J
(uˆ,vˆ)
2 (x) for all v ∈ V and ∀x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p
Condition (i) states that given some fixed player II control policy vˆ ∈ V player I can-
not profitably deviate from playing the control policy uˆ. Analogously, condition (ii) is the
equivalent statement given the player I’s control policy is fixed as uˆ, player II cannot prof-
itably deviate from vˆ. We therefore see that (uˆ, vˆ) is an equilibrium in the sense of a Nash
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equilibrium since for both players, given their opponent plays the equilibrium policy, neither
player has an incentive to deviate.
We generalise our zero-sum Theorem 6.1 to cover non-zero-sum payoff structure with the
use of a Nash Equilibrium solution concept.
Theorem 7.3. [Verification Theorem for Non-Zero-Sum Games with Impulse
Control]
Let us suppose that conditions (i), (iii)-(iv) of Theorem 6.1 hold and that the value of
the game exists and that there exists a functions φi, i ∈ {1, 2} s.th. φi that satisfy technical
conditions (T1) - (T4) and the following conditions:
(i’) φi ≥Miφi on S and the regions Di are defined by:
Di = {X ∈ S;φi(X) > Miφi(X)}, i ∈ {1, 2} where we refer to D1 (resp., D2) as the
player I (resp., player II) continuation region.
(ii’) ∂φ1
∂s
+ Lφ1(X
·,u,vˆ(·)) + f1(X
·,u,vˆ(·))
≥ ∂φ1
∂s
+ Lφ1(X
·,uˆ,vˆ(·)) + f1(X
·,uˆ,vˆ(·)) ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ U , X ∈ S\D1.
(iii’) ∂φ2
∂s
+ Lφ2(X
·,uˆ,v(·)) + f2(X
·,uˆ,v(·))
≥ ∂φ2
∂s
+ Lφ2(X
·,uˆ,vˆ(·)) + f2(X
·,uˆ,vˆ(·)) ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V , X ∈ S\D2.
(iv’) ∂φi
∂s
+ Lφi(X
·,uˆ,vˆ(·)) + fi(X
·,uˆ[t,s],vˆ[t,s](·)) = 0 ∀X ∈ D1 ∩D2.
(v’) ξˆk ∈ argsupz∈Z{φi(Γ(X(τk−), z))− c(τk, z)} is a Borel Measurable selection and simi-
larly, ηˆj ∈ argsupz∈Z{φi(Γ(X(τj−), z))− χ(ρj , z)} is a Borel Measurable selection.
Put τˆ0 ≡ t and define uˆ := [τˆj , ξˆj ]j∈N inductively by τˆj+1 = inf{s > τj ;X
uˆ[t,s],v(·) /∈
D1} ∧ τS ∀v ∈ V similarly, put ρˆ0 ≡ t and define vˆ := [ρˆm, ηˆm]m∈N inductively by ρˆm+1 =
inf{s > ρm;X
u,vˆ[t,s](·) /∈ D2} ∧ τS ∀u ∈ U .
Then (uˆ, vˆ) is a Nash equilibrium for the game, that is to say the following statements
hold:
φ1(x) = sup
u∈U
J
(u,vˆ)
1 (x) = J
(uˆ,vˆ)
1 (x), (53)
and
φ2(x) = sup
v∈V
J
(uˆ,v)
2 (x) = J
uˆ,vˆ
2 (x). (54)
∀x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p.
The proof of Theorem 7.3 follows a similar path to that of Theorem 6.1. We therefore
defer the proof of the theorem to the appendix.
In an analogous manner to Corollary 6.2, we can readily arrive at the following corollary
to Theorem 7.3:
Corollary 7.4.
The sample space aligneds into three regions that represent a region in which player I
intervenes I1, a region in which player II intervenes I2, and a region in which no action is
taken by either player I or player II; moreover the three regions are characterised by the
following expressions for j ∈ {1, 2}:
Ij = {x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p : Vj(x) =MjVj(x),LVj(x) + fj(x) ≥ 0}.
I3 = {x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p : Vj(x) ≥MjVj(x);LVj(x) + fj(x) = 0}.
8 The Duopoly Investment Problem Revisited
In this section we apply the results of section 7 to prove Theorem 4.3. Let us denote by Y
the process Y (s) = (s+ t0, X1(s), X2(s)), where X1, X2 ∈ C([t, τS ],R
p) are processes which
represent the market share processes for Firm 1 and Firm 2 respectively and whose evolution
is described by (5) - (6). We wish to fully characterise the optimal investment strategies for
each firm, in order to do this we will invoke 7.3. We will restrict ourselves to the case when
θij(s) ≡ θ¯ij ∈ R\0 and σij(s) ≡ σ¯ij ∈ R\0.
We firstly make the following important observations:
Given some test function φ ∈ C1,2([t, τS ],R) the infinitesimal generator L associated to Y is
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given by:
Lφ(y) =
∂φ
∂t
+
2∑
j=1
µj
∂φ
∂xj
+
1
2
2∑
i,j=1
σ2i,j
∂2ψ1(x1, x2)
∂xi∂xj
+
∫
R
{φ(s, x1 + σ1jz, x2 + σ2jz)− φ(s, x1, x2)− σ1jz
∂φ
∂x1
− σ2jz
∂φ
∂x2
}νj(dz)
∀y ≡ (t, x1, x2) ∈ [t, τS ]× R× R.
Given an admissible Firm 1 (resp., Firm 2) investment policy u = [τj , ξj ]j∈N ∈ U (resp.,
v = [ρm, ηm]m∈N ∈ V) we note that the following identities hold:
X1(τj) = Γ(X1(τj−) + ∆NX1(τj), ξj) = Xˆ1(τj) + ξj . (55)
X2(ρm) = Γ(X2(ρm−) + ∆NX2(ρm), ηm) = Xˆ2(ρm) + ηm. (56)
The Firm 1 and Firm 2 investments are given by the following expressions ∀x ∈ R:
M1ψ = sup
ξ∈Z
{ψ(τ, x+ ξ)− (λ1ξ + κ1)}. (57)
M2ψ = sup
η∈Z
{ψ(τ, x+ η)− (λ2η + κ2)}. (58)
where τ ∈ [t, τS ] is some F−measurable stopping time.
Recall that the Firm 1 and the Firm 2 profit functions are given by:
Π1(y;u, v) = E
[y]
[ ∫ τS
t0
e−ǫr[α1X
t1,x1,u,v
1 (r)dr − β1X
t2,x2,u,v
2 (r)]
−
∑
j≥1
c1(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤τS} + γ1e
−ǫτS [Xt1,x1,u,v1 (τS)]
2[Xt2,x2,u,v2 (τS)]
2
]
.
(59)
Π2(y;u, v) = E
[y]
[ ∫ τS
t0
e−ǫr[α2X
t2,x2,u,v
2 (r) − β2X
t1,x1,u,v
1 (r)]dr
−
∑
m≥1
c2(ρm, ηm) · 1{ρm≤τS} + γ2e
−ǫτS [Xt1,x1,u,v1 (τS)]
2[Xt2,x2,u,v2 (τS)]
2
]
.
(60)
where xi := Xi(ti) ∈ R and ti ∈ R
+ is the starting point for Firm i.
Given the setup of Theorem 7.3., at time s ∈ [t0, τS ] our running cost fi is now given by:
e−ǫs(αiXi−βiXj); i, j ∈ {1, 2}; the player i intervention costs are given by: ci(τ, ξ) = λiξ+κi
for some intervention time τ ∈ [t0, τS ] and intervention ξ ∈ Z and the player i terminal
reward is given by: Gi(Y (τS)) = πγIe
−ǫτS [Xi(τS)]
2[Xj(τS)]
2.
We can now apply the conditions of 7.3., to show that the value function is a solution to
the following Stefan problem:
Lφi(y) + fi = 0, ∀y ∈ D = D1 ∩D2 (61)
∂
∂z
φ1(x1 + z, x2) = e
−ǫtλ1, ∀y /∈ D = D1 ∩D2 (62)
Indeed (61) is immediately observed using (iv’) of 7.3. This implies that:
0 =α1e
−ǫtx1 − β1e
−ǫtx2 +
∂φ1
∂t
+
2∑
j=1
µj
∂φ1
∂xj
+
1
2
2∑
i,j=1
σ2ij
∂2ψ1(x1, x2)
∂xi∂xj
+
∫
R
{φ1(s, x1 + θ1jz, x2 + θ2jz)− φ1(s, x1, x2)− θ1jz
∂φ1
∂x1
− θ2jz
∂φ1
∂x2
}νj(dz). (63)
We now try a candidate for the function, i.e. we specify the form:
φ1(y) = e
−ǫtψ1(x1, x2). (64)
for some ǫ > 0.
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After plugging (64) into (63), we find that:
α1x1 − β1x2 − ǫψ1(x1, x2)+
2∑
j=1
µj
∂ψ1(x1, x2)
∂xj
+
1
2
2∑
i,j=1
σ2ij
∂2ψ1(x1, x2)
∂xi∂xj
+
2∑
j=1
∫
R
{ψ1(x1 + θ1jz, x2 + θ2jz)− ψ1(x1, x2)− zθ1j
∂ψ1(x1, x2)
∂x1
−zθ2j
∂ψ1(x1, x2)
∂x2
}νj(dz) = 0.
(65)
Let us now suppose that ψ1(x1, x2) ≡ ψ1(x1) + ψ1(x2) hence using (65) we deduce that:
α1x1 − β1x2 +
2∑
i=1
{
− ǫψ1(xi) + µi
∂ψ1(xi)
∂xi
+
1
2
2∑
i=1
σ2ii
∂2ψ1(xi)
∂x2i
}
+
2∑
i,j=1
∫
R
{ψ1(xi + θijz)− ψ1(xi)− zθij
∂ψ1(xi)
∂xi
}νj(dz) = 0. (66)
After which we find that ψ1 is a solution to
h(y) = A1e
r1x1 +A2e
r2x1 +
α1
ǫ
x1 +B1e
r1x2 +B2e
r2x2 −
β1
ǫ
x2 +
1
2ǫ2
(µ1α1 − µ2β1), (67)
where A1, A2, B1, B2 ∈ R are unknown constants and r1 and r2 are roots of the equation:
q(rk) :=
1
2
σ2iir
2
k + µirk − ǫ+
∫
R
{erkθijz − 1− θijrkz}νj(dz), (68)
for i, j, k ∈ {1, 2}.
W.log. let us set r1 < r2. Now since lim|r|→∞ q(r) = ∞ and q(0) = −ǫ < 0 and since ∀
r, z we have that: {erkθijz − 1− θijrkz}νj(dz) > 0 we find that:
|r1| > r1. (69)
and
r1 < 0 < r2, (70)
Our ansatz for the continuation region D1 is that it takes the form:
D1 = {x1 > x
∗
1|x1, x
∗
1 ∈ R}. (71)
We now derive (62) and in doing so we shall determine x∗1.
Now for all x1 ≤ x
∗
1 we have that:
ψ1(x1, x2) =M1ψ1(x1, x2) = sup
z∈Z
{ψ1(x1 + z, x2)− (κ1 + λ1z)}. (72)
We wish to determine the value z that maximises (72), hence let us now define the function
G by the following expression:
G(ξ) = ψ1(x1 + ξ, x2)− (κ1 + λ1ξ) (73)
∀ ξ ∈ Z, x1, x2 ∈ R.
We now seek to evaluate the maxima of (73) hence when:
G′(ξ) = 0. (74)
We see that the following expression holds ∀x1, x2 ∈ R, ξ ∈ Z:
ψ′1(x1 + ξ, x2) = λ1. (75)
Let us now consider a unique point xˆ1 ∈ (0, x
∗
1) then:
ψ′1(xˆ1, x2) = λ1. (76)
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Hence, we have that
xˆ1 = x1 + ξˆ(x1) or ξˆ(x1) = xˆ1 − x1. (77)
We therefore we deduce that for x ∈ (0, x∗1) we have that:
ψ1(x1, x2) = ψ1(xˆ1, x2)− κ1 + λ1(x1 − xˆ1). (78)
Using (75) - (76) and (78) and inserting (67) we can construct the following system of
equations:
A1r1e
r1x
∗
1 +A2r2e
r2x
∗
1 +
α1
ǫ
= λ1, (79)
A1r1e
r1xˆ1 +A2r2e
r2xˆ1 +
α1
ǫ
= λ1, (80)
A1(e
r1x
∗
1 − er1xˆ1) +A2(e
r2x
∗
1 − er2xˆ1) = −κ1 +
(
λ1 −
α1
ǫ
)
(x∗1 − xˆ1). (81)
Repeating the above steps for φ2 leads to an analogous set of equations as (79)-(81) with
(A1, A2, x
∗
1, xˆ1, α1, λ1) replaced by (B1, B2, x
∗
2, xˆ2, α2, λ2).
Now, since the system (59) - (60) is invariant under the transformations {1 ↔ 2} then
we must have A1 = B1(:= C1) and A2 = B2(:= C2) (since (67) must still be a solution to
(iv) after the transformation {1 ↔ 2}). Hence, we are left with a system of 6 unknowns
(C1, C2, x
∗
1, xˆ1, x
∗
2, xˆ2) and 6 equations. We can therefore uniquely determine the values
(C1, C2, x
∗
1, xˆ1, x
∗
2, xˆ2) - this proves Theorem 4.3.
9 Conclusion
Using standard assumptions, we proved a verification theorem for a stochastic differential
game with impulse controls, then generalising the results to cover a non-zero-sum payoff
structure where the appropriate equilibrium concept is a Nash equilibrium. Having charac-
terised the value for the stochastic differential game, we then applied the results to charac-
terise optimal investment strategies for the dynamic advertising duopoly problem described
in section 2.
An interesting question for future research is investigating the above framework (in which
the controllers use impulse controls to modify the state process) when either or both of
the players only has access to partial information. Of particular interest is partial state
information- that is, a system in which the state process is adapted to some subset of the
canonical filtration. A single player impulse controller version of a framework in which
players have partial state information was studied in [kS08], here the controller’s actions are
subject to some execution delay so that there is some non-zero lag between the decision to
apply an impulse intervention and the execution being carried out.
In [kS08] it is shown that the delayed reaction problem can be transformed into a se-
quence of no-delay optimal stopping problems and thus forming an equivalence between
non-delay impulse control problems and delay impulse control problems. Naturally, investi-
gating whether such an equivalence relationship between delay and non-delay problems in
the controller-stopper framework serves as an interesting area of discussion.
Another form of partial information is that of incomplete information about the pay-
off criterion - continuous controller-stopper games in which the players have asymmetric
information about some fixed payoff index is investigated in [Gru12].
10 Appendix
Technical Conditions for (T1) - (T4).
(T1) Assume that E[
∫ τs
t
1∂D(X
·,u(s))ds] = 0 for all X ∈ S, u ∈ U where D ≡ D1 ∪D2.
(T2) ∂D is a Lispchitz surface - that is to say that ∂D is locally the graph of a Lipschitz
continuous function: φ ∈ C2(S\∂D) with locally bounded derivatives.
(T3) The sets {φ−(X ·,u(τm)); τm ∈ [t, τS ], ∀m ∈ N} and {φ
−(X ·,u(ρ)); ρ ∈ T } are uniformly
integrable ∀x ∈ S, u ∈ U .
(T4) E[|φ(X ·,u(τm))|+ |φ(X
·,u(ρ))|+
∫ τS
t
|Lφ(X ·,u(s))|ds] <∞,
∀ intervention times τm ∈ [t, τS ], ρ ∈ T , u ∈ U .
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Proof of Lemma 5.3.
Firstly, for s ∈ [t, τS ], let us set Θi(s) ≡ λi, i ∈ {1, 2} and suppose that ξ(s) ≡ ν
+
1 (s) −
ν−1 (s) and η(s) ≡ ν
+
2 (s)− ν
−
2 (s) for player I and player II controls (resp.) where ν
+
i and ν
−
i ,
i ∈ {1, 2} are given by the using expressions:
ν+1 (s) =
1
2
[∑
j≥1
(ξj · 1{ξj>0} + λ
−1
1 κ1 · 1{τj≤s} − λ
−1
1 κ1) · 1{τj≤s}
]
, (82)
ν−1 (s) = −
1
2
[∑
j≥1
(ξj · 1{ξj<0} + λ
−1
1 κ1 · 1{τj≤s} − λ
−1
1 κ1) · 1{τj≤s}
]
(83)
and similarly for the player II control:
ν+2 (s) =
1
2
[ ∑
m≥1
(ηm · 1{ηm>0} + λ
−1
2 κ2 · 1{ρm≤s} − λ
−1
2 κ2) · 1{ρm≤s}
]
(84)
ν−2 (s) = −
1
2
[ ∑
m≥1
(ηm · 1{ηm<0} + λ
−1
2 κ2 · 1{ρm≤s} − λ
−1
2 κ2) · 1{ρm≤s}
]
(85)
We do the proof for the player II impulse controls, the proof for the player I part is
analogous. Hence, using (82) - (83) we readily deduce that:
dη(s) = dν+2 (s)− dν
−
2 (s)
=
1
2
∑
m≥1
(ηm · 1{ηm>0} + 2λ
−1
2 κ2 · 1{ρm≤s} − λ
−1
2 κ2) · δρm(s)
+
1
2
∑
m≥1
(ηm · 1{ηm<0} + 2λ
−1
2 κ2 · 1{ρm≤s} − λ
−1
2 κ2) · δρm(s)
=
∑
m≥1
(ηm + (2 · 1{ρm≤s} − 1)λ
−1
2 κ2) · δρm(s)
Hence using the properties of the Dirac-delta function and by Fubini’s theorem we find,∫ τS
t
Θ2(s)dη(s) =
∑
m≥1
∫ τS
t
(λ2ηm + (2 · 1{ρm≤s} − 1)κ2) · δρm(s)
=
∑
m≥1
∫ τS
t
(λ2ηm + (2 · 1s∈[ρm,∞) − 1)κ2) · δρm(s)
=
µ[t,τS ](v)∑
m=1
(λ2ηm + κ2) =
∑
m≥1
χ(ρm, ηm) · 1{ρm≤τS}.
Lastly, we compute η(s), indeed we observe that:
η(s) = ν+2 (s) + ν
−
2 (s)
=
∑
m≥1
((ηm + λ
−1
2 κ2 · 1{ρm≤s})− λ
−1
2 κ2) · 1{ρm≤s} · 1{ηm>0}
+
∑
m≥1
((ηm + λ
−1
2 κ2 · 1{ρm≤s})− λ
−1
2 κ2) · 1{ρm≤s} · 1{ηm<0}.
Now, since 1{ρm≤s} · 1{ρm≤s} = 1{ρm≤s} we find that:
η(s) =
∑
m≥1
(ηm + λ
−1
2 κ2 − λ
−1
2 κ2) · 1{ρm≤s} =
∑
m≥1
ηm · 1{ρm≤s} =
µ[t,s](v)∑
m=1
ηm.
Hence, after repeating the exercise for the player I controls (using that ξ(s) := ν+1 (s)−
ν−1 (s)) and setting ν(s) = ν
+(s) − ν−(s) where ν+(s) ≡ ν+1 (s) + ν
+
2 (s), ν
− ≡ ν−1 + ν
−
2 we
recover the impulse control game.
Proof of Theorem 7.3.
We prove the theorem for player I with the proof for player II being the same up to a
trivial modification.
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As in the proof of Theorem 6.1, let us fix the player II control vˆ ∈ V ; we firstly appeal
to Dynkin’s formula for jump diffusion processes hence for X = Xu,vˆ we have the following:
E[φ1(X
t,x0,u,vˆ(τj))]− E[φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τj+1−))]
= −E
[ ∫ τj+1
τj
∂φ1
∂s
+ Lφ(Xt,x0,u,vˆ(s))ds
]
.
Summing from j = 0 to j = k implies that:
φ1(x) +
k∑
j=1
E[φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τj))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j ))]− E[φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−k+1))] (86)
= −E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
∂φ1
∂s
+ Lφ1(X
t,x0,u,vˆ(s))ds
]
. (87)
Now by similar reasoning as in the zero-sum case (c.f. (38)), we have that:
M1φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j ))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j )) + c1(τj , ξj)
≥ φ1(X
t,x0,u,vˆ(τj))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j )). (88)
Inserting (88) into (87) implies that:
φ1(x) +
k∑
j=1
E[M1φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j ))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j ))
+ c1(τj , ξj)− E[φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−k+1))]
≥ −E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
∂φ1
∂s
+ Lφ1(X
t,x0,u,vˆ(s))ds
]
. (89)
Additionally, by (II) we have that:
∂φ
∂s
+ Lφ1(X
t,x0,u[t,s],vˆ[t,s](s))
≥
∂φ
∂s
+ Lφ1(X
uˆ[t,s],vˆ[t,s](s)) + f1(X
t,x0,uˆ[t,s],vˆ[t,s](s)− f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s],vˆ[t,s](s)))
≥ −f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s],vˆ[t,s](s)).
Or
−
(∂φ
∂s
+ Lφ1(X
t,x0,u[t,s],vˆ[t,s](s))
)
≤ f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s],vˆ[t,s](s)). (90)
Hence, inserting (90) into (89) yields:
φ1(x) +
k∑
j=1
E[M1φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j ))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−j )) + c(τj , ξj)] · 1{τj≤τS}
−E[φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u,vˆ(τ−k+1))]
≥ E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s],vˆ[t,s](s))ds
]
.
Now, as in the proof for the zero-sum case, we have, using (ii) that
lims→τ−S
[Miφi(X
t,x0,u,v(s)) − φi(Xˆ
t,x0,u,v(s))] = 0, i ∈ {1, 2} and
lims→τ−
S
φ(X ·,u,v(s)) = G(X ·,u,v(τS))] ∀u ∈ U , v ∈ VP−a.s.. Hence, after taking the limit
k →∞, we recognise:
φ1(x) ≥ E
[ ∫ τS
t
f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s],vˆ[t,s](s))ds−
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤τS} +G(X
·,u,v(τS))
]
. (91)
or
φ1(x) ≥ J
(u,vˆ)
1 (x). (92)
Since this holds for all u ∈ U we have for all x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p
φ1(x) ≥ sup
u∈U
J
(u,vˆ)
1 (x). (93)
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Now, applying the above arguments and fixing the pair of controls (uˆ, vˆ) ∈ U ×V yields the
following equality:
φ1(x) = sup
u∈U
J
(u,vˆ)
1 (x) = J
uˆ,vˆ
1 (x). (94)
∀x ∈ [t, τS ] × R
p. After using an analogous argument for the player II policy v ∈ V (fixing
the player I control as uˆ), we deduce that ∀ x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p:
φ2(x) ≥ sup
u∈U
J
(u,vˆ)
2 (x), (95)
after which we observe the following statements:
φ2(x) = sup
v∈V
J
(uˆ,v)
2 (x) = J
uˆ,vˆ
2 (x). (96)
φ1(x) = sup
u∈U
J
(u,vˆ)
1 (x) = J
uˆ,vˆ
1 (x). (97)
from which we deduce that (uˆ, vˆ) is a Nash equilibrium and hence the thesis is proven.
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